Justice and Responsibility-Sensitive Egalitarianism

Among egalitarians, what extent should responsibility play as a deciding factor in assessing the acceptability of inequalities? So-called luck egalitarians agree that instances of genuine choice are decisive in attributing responsibility for disadvantage, and in justifying unequal distributions of [...]
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Among egalitarians, what extent should responsibility play as a deciding factor in assessing the acceptability of inequalities? So-called luck egalitarians agree that instances of genuine choice are decisive in attributing responsibility for disadvantage, and in justifying unequal distributions of social goods. In this exciting new contribution to this literature, the author explores the correct place to locate the cut between choice and chance, or between those inequalities for which it is fair to hold one responsible, and those for which it is not. The argument carefully traces a thread of intellectual history through Marx and Mill, and into Cohen and Rawls, identifying a singular rejection of strong property rights which we inherit from Locke, and find in contemporary defenders of strong entitlements such as Nozick. The result is an egalitarian position which treats responsibility seriously, while maintaining our liberal commitments to impartiality and non-arbitrariness in the distribution of rights and responsibilities in contemporary society.