Truth and Objectivity

Crispin Wright offers an original perpsective on the place of "realism" in philosophical inquiry, proposing a new framework for discussing the claims of the realists and the anti-realists. This framework rejects the classical "deflationary" conception of truth, yet allows both disputants to respect [...]
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Crispin Wright offers an original perpsective on the place of "realism" in philosophical inquiry, proposing a new framework for discussing the claims of the realists and the anti-realists. This framework rejects the classical "deflationary" conception of truth, yet allows both disputants to respect the intuition that judgements, whose status they contest, are at least semantically fitted for truth and may often justifiably be regarded as true. In the course of his argument, Wright offers original critical discussions of many central concerns of philosophers interested in realism, including "deflationary" conception of truth, internal realist truth, scientific realism and the theoreticity of observation, and the role of moral states of affairs in explanations of moral beliefs.