Epistemic Risk

The articles included in this thesis centre on
what can be called the normative basis of
risk analysis. Since risk analyses are decision
procedures, they should adhere to norms of
rational decision-making, and this they do.
Most risk analysis schemes are built on a
notion of the de [...]
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The articles included in this thesis centre on
what can be called the normative basis of
risk analysis. Since risk analyses are decision
procedures, they should adhere to norms of
rational decision-making, and this they do.
Most risk analysis schemes are built on a
notion of the decision theoretic maxim that
the goal of every decision is to maximize
expected utility. However, for some thirty years
now this maxim has been called into question.
The idea is not that it is unreasonable in itself,
but that the theoretical construct of which it is
a consequence is in some way inappropriate.
Idealizations of the theories are criticized for
being too excessive. They do not properly
cover
cases where the decision maker has
poor or, as it were, imprecise knowledge. If it
is important for a normative decision theory
to be not only ideal as a theoretical construct,
but to have, in addition, a prescriptive
purpose,
that theory should also be applicable
to actual decision makers.